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Abstract
Managers can improve real risk-adjusted firm performance by matching nominal
assets with nominal liabilities, thereby reducing the sensitivity of real risk-adjusted
returns to unexpected inflation. The Net Asset Value (NAV) of US equity Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) serves as a good proxy for nominal assets and
accordingly we use a sample of US REITs to test our hypothesis. We find that
for the firms in our sample: (i) their real, risk-adjusted performance, and (ii) their
inflation hedging qualities are inversely related to deviations from this “matching-
nominals” argument. In addition to providing managers with a vehicle to maximise
real, risk-adjusted performance, our findings also provide investors with the tools
to infer inflation-hedging qualities of equity investments.
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1 Introduction
One of the fundamental motivations for investing in financial assets is arguably to
accumulate wealth in order to fund future consumption (Merton, 1969). The ability
to consume out of wealth is determined by its real purchasing power. However, the
purchasing power of wealth depends on the price level and is thus a real, rather than a
nominal concept (Ritter, 2002). From this point of view, firm managers should aim
to maximise real, rather than nominal, risk-adjusted performance. Managers can
arguably influence real risk-adjusted firm performance through a variety of means,
especially the pursuit of a suitable investment policy that determines the firm’s asset
structure. In this study, we argue that, conditional on a given asset structure, a firm
can optimise its real risk-adjusted performance through the choice of an appropriate
financing policy. We propose that real risk-adjusted returns to equity are a function
of the firm’s holdings of nominal and real assets and liabilities and that managers can
optimise real, risk-adjusted returns by matching the holdings of nominal liabilities
with nominal assets.
Real risk-adjusted performance is difficult to optimise partly due to the variation
in the general price level. In an efficient market, the returns on nominal contracts
account for expected inflation (Bach and Stephenson, 1974; Fama, 1970). However,
the uncertainty surrounding unexpected inflation is more difficult to manage. Fig-
ure 1 shows that expected US CPI inflation averaged 0.2% per month between 1989
and 2011. However, over the same time period, the volatility of monthly unexpected
inflation also averaged 0.2%. These statistics suggest that under a Normal distribu-
tion, there is a c. 15% chance that inflation was more than twice as high, in a given
month, as expected. Furthermore, unexpected inflation has increased over the last
22 years, peaking at 0.6% per month in 2008. This observation suggests that the
risk of unexpected inflation is of growing importance, especially given the uncertain
longer-term consequences of recent expansionary monetary policy measures.
The net balance of nominal assets and liabilities influences the real return to eq-
uity, as well as its volatility, by modifying the exposure of equity to expected and
unexpected inflation risks. Real risk-adjusted performance, ceteris paribus, is con-
ditionally maximised when nominal liabilities are matched with nominal assets in
an increasing, monotonic fashion. The appropriate choice of nominal liabilities for
a given level of nominal assets reduces the volatility of the real return to equity by
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attenuating the impact of unexpected inflation, thereby improving the risk efficiency
of an investment in the firm’s equity.
Previous authors have found it difficult to identify and measure nominal and real
assets and liabilities (Amihud, 1996; French, Ruback, and Schwert, 1983). We study
a sample of US Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to test the “matching-
nominals” hypothesis. REITs represent a useful case study because they follow a
regulated business model of investing in and deriving income from operating real
estate assets, which simplifies the composition of their balance sheet. We employ
the net asset value (NAV) of the REITs as our proxy for nominal assets. Detailed
data on REIT NAVs is available from a REIT-specific data provider. Our empirical
evidence suggests that the NAV is insensitive to inflation, confirming that it repre-
sents a suitable proxy for nominal assets. In sum, our focus on REITs enables us
to distinguish effectively between real and nominal assets and liabilities, reducing
potential measurement errors and increasing the power of our empirical tests.
Our argument produces two main testable implications. First, if our rationale is
correct, then we expect firms that match nominal assets with nominal liabilities to
deliver stronger real risk-adjusted performance, ceteris paribus. Further, we also ex-
pect these firms to offer stronger inflation hedging qualities to their equity investors,
ceteris paribus. Consequently, we explore empirically whether real risk-adjusted firm
performance and the strength of a firm’s inflation hedging qualities decline in the
deviation from the match between nominal assets and liabilities that we propose. We
find that departures from this match significantly reduce real risk-adjusted perfor-
mance as measured by the real Sharpe ratio, and also significantly impair inflation
hedging qualities.
Our findings have several implications for managers and investors. We offer a sim-
ple rule that allows managers to improve real risk-adjusted performance and hedge
unexpected inflation. Further, our results imply that investors can infer inflation
hedging capabilities of equity investments from the firm’s capital structure. In addi-
tion, our findings suggest that firms may hold leverage in excess of firm-characteristic
informed target levels in order to manage the exposure of equity to unexpected infla-
tion risks and improve real risk-adjusted performance. Our results also contribute to
the debate about the inflation-hedging qualities of equities investments. We suggest
that variation in these qualities may be a function of capital structure.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 presents the model alongside a set of simulation re-
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sults to derive testable implications. Section 3 presents data, method and descriptive
statistics, Section 4 discusses our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Real risk-adjusted returns and capital structure
The Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) states
that nominal risk-adjusted returns cannot be improved through capital structure,
as investors can employ home-made leverage to replicate the financing strategy
of the firm. However, Frazzini and Pedersen (2011) argue that there are leverage-
constrained investors, such as pension funds, who are unable to employ home-made
leverage. Consistent with this view, we argue that these leverage-constrained in-
vestors benefit from delegating the management of capital structure choices to the
firm. On the other hand, unconstrained investors are still in a position to lever-
age and de-leverage in order to manage capital structure, performance and inflation
hedging objectives independently at no extra cost. On balance, a firm is able to
increase the supply of its capital by expanding the potential investor base to include
leverage-constrained investors. In this context, a manager acting in the interests of
shareholders is concerned with the real, risk-adjusted return to equity.
Consider a simple, mature firm that holds a combination of assets and liabilities.
These contracts can be classified as either nominal or real. Contracts whose value
fluctuates with the prevailing price level are classified as real contracts and contracts
whose value is uncorrelated with the prevailing price level are classified as nominal
contracts. The asset structure of the firm is determined exogenously via its invest-
ment policy. Once the asset holding has been determined, the manager’s objective
is then to identify an appropriate liability structure that will maximise the real,
risk-adjusted returns to equity.
If we consider a simple one-period, deterministic framework and let E0 denote the
mareket price of firm equity at time t = 0, defined as the sum ofthe market value of
real and nominal assets and liabilities:
E0 = (MVA
R
0 −MV LR0 ) + (MVAN0 −MV LN0 ) (1)
where MVAR0 and MV L
R
0 are the market values of the firm’s real assets and liabil-
ities at time t = 0, and where MVAN0 and MV L
N
0 are the corresponding market
values of the nominal assets and liabilities. We assume E0 > 0. At t = 1, unexpected
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inflation has caused the general price level to change at rate eu so that the value of
firm equity at t = 1, E1, is then:
E1 =
(
MVAR0 e
κ −MV LR0
)
er+u +
(
MVAN0 e
κ −MV LN0
)
er+α (2)
where r is the premium for real corporate debt LR0 over the risk-free rate measured
at time t = 1. The variables κ and α represent the the premia that differentiates
the return on assets from that on liabilities, and returns on nominal assets and
liabilities from those on their real counterparts, respectively. [TO Do, fix this] The
total, one-period, continuously compounded excess return on firm equity, R, is then
given by:
R = ln
[
E1
E0
]
= ln
[(
MVAR0 e
κ −MV LR0
)
er+u +
(
MVAN0 e
κ −MV LN0
)
er+α
(MVAR0 −MV LR0 ) + (MVAN0 −MV LN0 )
]
(3)
Accounting for inflation, the one-period real excess return on firm equity, RR, is:
RR = ln
[(
MVAR0 e
κ −MV LR0
)
er +
(
MVAN0 e
κ −MV LN0
)
er+α−u
(MVAR0 −MV LR0 ) + (MVAN0 −MV LN0 )
]
(4)
The sensitivity of real equity returns to unexpected inflation, S, is given by the
partial derivative of RR with respect to u:
S =
∂RR
∂u
=
−e−u (MVAN0 er+α+κ −MV LN0 er+α)
E1
(5)
Setting S to zero and solving for the level of nominal liabilities yields:
S = 0 =⇒ MV LN0 = MVAN0 eκ =⇒ MV LN0 ∝MVAN0 (6)
That is, the sensitivity to unexpected inflation of real returns to equity is minimised
by setting nominal liabilities to be in direct proportion to the nominal assets of the
firm. If the net nominal position (assets minus liabilities) is zero, then the firms
remaining real position will move in line with the general price level and so will
generate real returns.
To maximise real, risk-adjusted returns to equity we optimise the trade-off between
risk and return in the mean-variance framework, that is by maximising the real
Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1966, 1994), defined as the ratio of the expectation and the
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standard deviation of RR:
SRR =
E
[
RR
]
SD [RR]
. (7)
We employ a set of simple simulations to illustrate the evolution of the components
of SRR as a function of nominal assets and liabilities in a stochastic setting. We
allow each of the variables, α, u, κ and r to be normally distributed such that: 2
[α u κ r]T ∼ N
(
[0.05 0 0.05 0.05]T ,DIAG ([0.05 0.05 0.04 0.1])
)
,
where DIAG(a b c d) is the 4×4 matrix with (a b c d) along the diagonals and zeros
elsewhere.
For each combination of nominal assets and liabilities along a range of possible
values, we calculate E
[
RR
]
and SD
[
RR
]
over the distribution of r, u, α and κ.
Figure 2(a) shows the results for E
[
RR
]
. This expectation increases in nominal
assets because nominal assets contribute positively to the return on equity by earning
the premium for expected inflation, α. For a given level of nominal assets, E
[
RR
]
is
a linear, decreasing function of nominal liabilities. Increasing nominal liabilities for
a given level of nominal assets reduces the net nominal position (MVAN0 −MV LN0 ),
and thus the exposure of equity to the return benefits of α. As equity is the residual
of assets and liabilities, a unit-change in nominal liabilities results in a constant
rate of change in E
[
RR
]
, irrespective of the current level of nominal assets. This
represented by the constant negative slope of the relationship between E
[
RR
]
and
nominal liabilities in Figure 2(a).
Figure 2(b) shows the results for SD
[
RR
]
. For positive shifts in the level of nominal
assets, SD
[
RR
]
generally increases. The reverse occurs at very high levels of nominal
liabilities. Then SD
[
RR
]
decreases in the level of nominal assets. The non-linear
evolution of SD
[
RR
]
reflects the interactions between nominal assets and liabilities
in determining the exposure of equity to unexpected inflation risks.
The sensitivity of the real return on equity to unexpected inflation risk depends
upon the net nominal position of the firm. When nominal liabilities are low, then
increasing nominal assets increases the net nominal position and thus the sensitivity
of the real return on equity to unexpected inflation. As a result, SD
[
RR
]
increases.
2 We choose parameter values to easily identify a general trend. Simulation results using different values
generate qualitatively similar results.
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When nominal assets and liabilities are approximately equal so that the net nominal
position of the firm is balanced, then this sensitivity is minimised. However, as the
level of nominal liabilities increases further, the net nominal position drifts out of
balance again. Consequently, the exposure of equity to unexpected inflation risks
increases, and so does the standard deviation of the real return to equity. When
nominal liabilities are high, an increase in nominal assets helps rebalance the net
nominal position, reduces the exposure to unexpected inflation risks and thus results
in a lower SD
[
RR
]
.
The ratio of these values gives the real Sharpe ratio as a function of nominal assets
and liabilities (Figure 3). The real Sharpe ratio is the product of the overall trade-off
between the costs and benefits of nominal assets and liabilities, namely, the exposure
to the return benefits of α and the exposure to unexpected inflation risks.
Higher levels of nominal assets increase the maximum SRR achievable, simply be-
cause the return-enhancing effect of nominal assets as these assets capture the return
benefits of α. For a given level of nominal assets, SRR is a concave function of nom-
inal liabilities reflecting the non-linear relationship between SD
[
RR
]
and the net
nominal position. When nominal liabilities are low, for a given level of nominal assets,
an additional unit of nominal liabilities reduces SD
[
RR
]
by more than it detracts
from E
[
RR
]
. On balance then, this additional unit of nominal liabilities increases
the real Sharpe ratio. For low levels of nominal liabilities, the marginal effect of a
reduction in the return sensitivity to unexpected inflation from an additional unit of
nominal liabilities outweighs that of the reduction in the expected return on equity
from foregoing some of the return benefits of α.
Balancing the risk and return drivers then, can result in a level of nominal liabilities
that maximises SRR. Beyond the maximum SRR, an additional unit of nominal
liabilities reduces SD
[
RR
]
by less than it detracts from E
[
RR
]
. The negative ef-
fect of nominal liabilities on the numerator of SRR from foregoing the benefits of
α outweighs the positive effect on the denominator from lower sensitivity to unex-
pected inflation. Recall that this volatility-reducing effect is reversed when nominal
liabilities become large (Figure 2(b)). This reversal is also reflected in the increasing
downward slope of SRR as a function of nominal liabilities. On balance, beyond the
optimum of SRR, an additional unit of nominal liabilities decreases SRR.
The optimal level of nominal liabilities that maximises SRR occurs where the dif-
ferentials of E
[
RR
]
and SD
[
RR
]
are equal. At this point, the marginal volatility-
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reducing effect of an additional unit of nominal liabilities is equal to the marginal
return-reducing impact from this additional unit. However, the figure suggests that
the Sharpe ratio-maximising amount of nominal liabilities is lower than the amount
that minimises SD
[
RR
]
. This difference is due to the fact that, on average, a unit-
increase in nominal liabilities reduces SD
[
RR
]
by less than it reduces E
[
RR
]
. This
occurs because beyond the minimum of SD
[
RR
]
, an additional unit of nominal lia-
bilities increases SD
[
RR
]
again. Therefore, the ratio between E
[
RR
]
and SD
[
RR
]
is maximised before SD
[
RR
]
is minimised.
The optimal, real Sharpe-ratio maximising amount of nominal liabilities is a positive
linear function of nominal assets. For SD
[
RR
]
, the optimal trade-off between the
costs and benefits of nominal assets and liabilities is achieved by linearly matching
these items, as with the deterministic case (6). For the real Sharpe ratio, which is
a direct function of SD
[
RR
]
, this optimal trade-off is still achieved by maintain-
ing a linear matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities. However,
the constant of proportionality appears to be smaller because, on average, a unit
increase in nominal liabilities reduces SD
[
RR
]
by less than it reduces E
[
RR
]
. This
differential impact shifts the optimal amount of nominal liabilities to the left.
Figure 4 summarises the optimal linear relationship between nominal assets and
liabilities that maximises SRR, given our simulation parameters. In both the deter-
ministic and stochastic cases, the real , risk-adjusted return to equity is maximised
by setting the amount of nominal liabilities to be a monotonically increasing, linear
function of nominal assets.
Our central claim then, is that matching nominal assets and liabilities improves
real risk-adjusted returns. Accordingly, we expect that deviations from the optimal
match between nominal assets and liabilities are inversely related to the firm’s real
Sharpe ratio. Central to this claim is that any improvement in real risk-adjusted
performance is related with a stronger hedge against unexpected inflation. In other
words, we suggest that deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets
and liabilities are inversely related to unexpected inflation hedging qualities of an
investment into the firm’s equity. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: A firm’s real Sharpe ratio is inversely related to the deviation from
the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities.
Hypothesis 2: A firm’s unexpected inflation hedging qualities are inversely related
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to the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities.
3 Data and method
Several authors have noted difficulty with identifying a good proxy for nominal
assets (Amihud, 1996; French, Ruback, and Schwert, 1983). We employ the Net
Asset Value (NAV) of US equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) as a proxy
for nominal assets. Equity REITs mainly derive income from leasing real estate
assets (Lehman and Roth, 2010). Rental payments under existing leases may be
fixed for considerable periods of time, if not the duration of the lease. Leases may
reflect inflation through indexation clauses that periodically adjust the rent to the
currently prevailing price level. However, given the discrete and infrequent nature of
these reviews, rental payments are relatively insensitive to changes in the price level.
Therefore, property leases are often considered a nominal asset (Hoesli, Lizieri, and
MacGregor, 2008; Zarowin, 1988).
The NAV reflects the book value of these leases as it is calculated by discounting
the expected rental income derived from these leases at an appropriate rate and
deducting any debt employed in the acquisition of the underlying properties (Chan,
Erickson, and Wang, 2003). Consistent with the characteristics of nominal contracts
in efficient markets (Bach and Stephenson, 1974; Fama, 1970), the rental income
projected on the basis of the leases will likely reflect expected inflation. However,
these projections cannot account for unexpected inflation. Therefore, in line with the
definition of nominal assets, the REIT’s NAV does not reflect unexpected inflation.
Figures 5 and 6 show that the natural logarithm of NAV is unrelated to unexpected
inflation (measured as the residuals after filtering monthly logged CPI figures using
an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000)).
We use this insight to establish the suitability of Net Asset Value as a proxy for
Nominal Assets. Recall that NAV is the difference between Gross Assets and Total
Debt, or in terms of nominal assets and debt:
NAV = AR +AN − LR − LN .
As NAV is insensitive to inflation, it follows that the real components have a negli-
gible net impact on NAV. Hence we suggest that a good proxy for nominal assets is
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the sum of NAV and nominal debt. That is,
AˆN = NAV + LN .
The optimal ”matching-nominals” relationship is then captured by:
LN = βAˆN + 
= Θ NAV + , where Θ =
β
1− β
So the deviations from this relationship are then given by
LN − βAˆN =
(
LN − Θˆ NAV
)
,
with Θˆ given by the coefficient of the regression of nominal debt against NAV. While
NAV is an imperfect proxy for nominal assets, the bias in using this proxy (β =
Θ/(Θ + 1)) filters through so as to not obfuscate the inferences made using (LN −
ΘNAV ) as the proxy for deviations from the ”matching-nominals” relationship.
The suitability of our proxy is dependent upon the insentivity of NAV to unexpected
inflation. Table 1 presents the results from a set of fixed-effects panel regressions of
the natural logarithm of the firm’s NAV as reported by SNL (discounted at an
average rate of 7.5%) on unexpected inflation (Column (1)) and the lag of unex-
pected inflation (Column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) replicate these regressions in
first differences. Based on these regression results, we accept that NAV is insensi-
tive to unexpected inflation and so accept that our proxy for deviation (from the
matching-nominals relationship) is sound. To proxy for nominal liabilities, we em-
ploy the firm’s holdings of fixed-rate debt, following Flannery and James (1984).
SNL provides detailed panel data on REIT NAV and fixed-rate debt.
We test our hypotheses using all listed US REITs (SIC code 6798), with the ex-
ception of mortgage REITs (GIC Code 40402030), in the cross-section of SNL and
Compustat from the inception of SNL in 1989 to 2011. All balance sheet data is
from SNL and Compustat. Firm returns are from the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP ). Inflation data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bond
yields are from the Federal Reserve. Data on the market, size and value factors as
well as the risk-free rate are from Kenneth French’s database.
We discard observations where the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, nominal
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assets to all assets or nominal liabilities to all liabilities lies outside the interval [0, 1].
All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We measure
earnings volatility and abnormal earnings contemporaneously to the observation of
the dependent variable. We measure all other variables at the fiscal year-end prior
to that (Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007; Johnson, 2003).
3.1 Empirical method
Liability matching and real risk-adjusted performance
First, we explore the relationship between real risk-adjusted performance and the
optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities. We relate a firm-year panel
of the annual real Sharpe ratios (SRR) of the REITs to a proxy for their annual
deviations from this optimal match (DEV ). We obtain the annual real Sharpe ratios
of the sample firms on the basis of monthly CRSP return data.
We argue that the Sharpe ratio-maximising amount of nominal liabilities is propor-
tional to nominal assets. The optimal constant of proportionality may differ for each
firm in each year, depending on the actual prevailing values of the parameters in
our model. For the empirical implementation, we examine a number of alternatives
for the parameter characterising the relationship between nominal assets and liabil-
ities. We assume direct proportionality as the optimal relationship between nominal
assets and liabilities. We measure the deviation from the optimal match between
nominal assets and liabilities for each firm-year, DEV , by computing the annual
squared differences between actual nominal liabilities and assets. 3
We estimate the following fixed-effects panel model:
SRRit = β0 + β1DEVit + β2LNSIZEit + β3PROFITit + β4MBit + β5FARit
+ β6ABEARNit + β7V OLit + β8DNOLit + β9MATit + uit (8)
where uit is the residual and standard errors are clustered by firm (Petersen, 2009;
Thompson, 2011). Real risk-adjusted performance may be viewed as a function of
the firm’s investment decisions and, as we suggest, its financing policy. We include
dummies for the firm’s property sector as a proxy for the firm’s investment strategy.
The property sector of a REIT arguably determines the type of leases, including
3 For robustness, we parametrise the optimal proportional relationship between nominal assets and liabili-
ties using empirical coefficient values obtained from a set of regressions of actual nominal liabilities on actual
nominal assets. We then measure the deviation as the annual squared differences between actual nominal
liabilities and the amounts of nominal assets derived from the empirical parametrisation. The results are
robust to these different parametrisations.
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indexation clauses. Therefore, the property sector may have an immediate impact
on real risk-adjusted performance. We also control for the set of capital structure
controls from Table 2. We account for latent economic shock factors using year
dummies. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we expect a negative sign on β1 in (8).
In order to explore the relative sensitivity of changes in the real Sharpe ratio to
changes in the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabil-
ities, we re-estimate equation (8) in first differences.
Liability matching and inflation hedging qualities
In order to examine the relationship between the unexpected inflation hedging qual-
ities of an investment into the firm’s equity and the optimal match between nominal
assets and liabilities, we relate the annual sensitivity of monthly nominal firm re-
turns to unexpected inflation to the deviation variable, DEV . In the calculation of
DEV , we assume direct proportionality between nominal assets and liabilities.
A stock is considered an inflation hedge if an inflationary shock does not affect real re-
turns, or, equivalently, if an inflationary shock results in a positive change in nominal
returns (Alchian and Kessel, 1959; Bodie, 1976; Branch, 1974; Fama and MacBeth,
1974; Lintner, 1973; Oudet, 1973). It is not possible to provide statistical evidence
for the absence of a relationship between real returns and inflation. Therefore, we
examine the relationship between nominal returns and inflation. We estimate each
firm’s unexpected inflation hedging qualities using annual regressions of the nominal
monthly excess firm returns (NRET ) on monthly unexpected inflation (UINFL)
and a set of controls. We compile a firm-year panel of the annual coefficients measur-
ing the sensitivity of nominal firm returns to unexpected inflation. A higher positive
coefficient value suggests stronger unexpected inflation hedging qualities.
We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI
figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou,
2000), and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. 4
In this regression, we control for the excess return on the market (MKT ), size
(SML) and value (HML) factors, expected inflation (EXPIN) and variation in
4 We choose this proxy for unexpected inflation since TIPS as a potential alternative, market-based proxy
are only available for maturities in excess of five years.
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the interest rate proxied by changes in the federal funds rate (CFFR):
NRETit = γ0 + γ1UINFLt + γ2MKTt + γ3SMBt + γ4HMLt
+ γ5EXPINt + γ6CFFRt + eit (9)
where eit is the residual. We collect the γ1 coefficients to compile a firm-year panel
of unexpected inflation sensitivities UINFLS. We then regress these UINFLS on
our proxy for the deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and
liabilities (DEV ). We control for the usual set of capital structure determinants,
including maturity, as well as property type and year dummies. We estimate the
following fixed-effects panel model:
UINFLSit = β0 + β1DEVit + β2LNSIZEit + β3PROFITit + β4MBit
+ β5ABEARNit + β6V OLit + β7DNOLit + β8MATit + uit (10)
where uit is the residual. We remedy the bias in the standard errors from het-
eroskedasticity potentially introduced by the estimated dependent variable in (10)
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm (Lewis and Linzer,
2005; Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, we expect a
negative sign on β1 in (10).
In order to explore the relative sensitivity of changes in the firm’s inflation hedging
characteristics to changes in the deviation from the optimal match between nominal
assets and liabilities, we re-estimate this specification in first differences.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the period 1989-2011. The mean nom-
inal debt (assets) to equity ratio is 1.91 (2.41). The mean firm size is US$1.28bn (in
constant August 1982 US$, deflated using PPI). The mean debt maturity, measured
as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt, is 49%. Asset maturity averages 33 years,
supporting the notion that the useful life of real estate assets is relatively long. The
profitability of the sample firms averages 8%. The mean market-to-book ratio is
1.24. This value is broadly consistent with Alcock, Steiner, and Tan (2014). This
observation suggests that the stable REIT business model of owning and operating
real estate assets offers low growth opportunities.
The volatility of earnings is relatively low at 2%. This observation supports the no-
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tion that REITs focus on a stable business model as suggested in (Boudry, Kallberg,
and Liu, 2010). Approximately 9% of all firm-year observations have losses carried
forward. Almost 48% of firm-year observations have debt ratings present.
Table 4 presents the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the main pre-
dictors. Correlations are generally low with the exception of the log of nominal assets
and firm size. This observation validates our range of alternative measures that we
employ in order to control for the effect of firm size in the analysis of Hypothesis 1.
Figure 7 shows a histogram with descriptive statistics for the unexpected inflation
sensitivity coefficients we estimate. The mean inflation sensitivity of the nominal
returns of our sample firms is significantly positive. This observation suggests that
on average for our study period, US listed equity REITs offer some inflation hedging
qualities. However, the histogram shows considerable dispersion around the mean.
Some firm-year observations have significantly positive values of unexpected infla-
tion sensitivity, while others have significantly negative values. This range of values
implies substantial variation in inflation hedging qualities. Our empirical results, dis-
cussed below, suggest that this variation may be related to capital structure choices.
4 Results
Table 5 presents the regression results for Hypothesis 1 over the study period 1989
to 2011. 5 Our results support the predicted relationship between the firm’s liability
structure and its real risk-adjusted performance. We find an inverse linear relation-
ship between the deviation from the optimal match between nominal assets and
liabilities and the real Sharpe ratio, after controlling for a set of variables reflecting
that real risk-adjusted performance is the product of the firm’s investment decisions
and its financing choices. Our evidence is robust to different parameter choices for
the constant of proportionality characterising the optimal matching relationship be-
tween nominal assets and liabilities (Columns 1 to 3). Our result is consistent with
our model’s implication that capital structure choices and real risk-adjusted perfor-
mance are related. Our finding suggests that, everything else being equal, a firm that
adheres to the optimal matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities
5 In unreported results, we find that our evidence is robust to excluding the period prior to 1992, marking
the introduction of the UPREIT legislation and thus the beginning of the modern REIT era, sometimes
considered a structural break in the REIT history. Our evidence is also robust to excluding the period after
2007, marking the onset of the recent global financial crisis.
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achieves a higher real Sharpe ratio. 6
However, our result also suggests that the relationship between the real Sharpe ratio
and deviations from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities is not
strictly linear. Column 4 of Table 5 presents the effect of changes in the deviation
from the optimal amount of nominal liabilities on changes in the real Sharpe ratio. 7
The corresponding coefficient is significantly negative. Larger deviations from the
optimum appear to have a decreasing relative negative impact on the real Sharpe
ratio. The marginal effect of an additional small shift away from the optimal amount
of nominal liabilities appears to be decreasing. As a result, managers have a strong
incentive to make small adjustments towards the optimal balance of nominal assets
and liabilities when the current deviation is small. As this deviation becomes larger,
the incentive to make more significant adjustments appears to become stronger.
Hypothesis 2 refers to the relationship between the firm’s liability structure and its
characteristics as a hedge against unexpected inflation. Table 6, Column 1, presents
the regression results of the firms’ annual unexpected inflation betas on the deviation
from the optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities. 8 Our results hold
when controlling, amongst others, for the property sector of the REITs that we
employ as a proxy for the investment strategy of the firm. This sector arguably
determines the structure of the leases and thus the terms under which rents adjust to
inflation. Our finding suggests that the liability structure of the firm has a significant
impact on unexpected inflation hedging qualities that is separate from the influence
of the asset and lease structures determined by the investment strategy of the firm.
More specifically, we find that deviations from the optimal match between nominal
assets and liabilities reduce the firm’s unexpected inflation beta. In our empirical
setting, a higher inflation beta stands for a higher sensitivity of the firm’s nominal
return to unexpected inflation. Therefore, a higher beta implies a superior hedge
against unexpected inflation. Our results suggest that observing the linear relation-
ship between nominal assets and liabilities modifies the sensitivity of the nominal
6 For robustness, we also explore the possibility of asymmetric consequences on real risk-adjusted perfor-
mance of firms holding either excess or insufficient amounts of nominal liabilities. We augment the relevant
regressions by an indicator for the sign of the raw deviation before squaring the difference in the construction
of DEV . We find no evidence for such asymmetries, suggesting that any deviations from the optimal amount
of nominal liabilities reduce real risk-adjusted performance, irrespective of their sign.
7 Given the robustness of our results to the different parameter choices for the constant to proportionality,
we focus here on the directly proportional case.
8 Given the robustness of our results up to this point to the different choices for the constant of propor-
tionality characterising the linear matching relationship between nominal assets and liabilities, from now on,
we focus our discussion on the results for the directly proportional case.
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return on equity to unexpected inflationary shocks. Consequently, it appears that
matching nominal assets and liabilities reduces the adverse effects of unexpected
inflation. In combination, our findings suggest a conceptual link between capital
structure choices, inflation hedging qualities and real risk-adjusted firm performance.
Further, we find that the firm’s unexpected inflation hedging qualities are inversely
related to debt maturity. This finding suggests that, everything else being equal,
an increase in the holdings of long-term debt appears to attenuate the inflation
sensitivity of the firm’s nominal returns. Our results also suggest that the firm’s
unexpected inflation hedging qualities are negatively related to the market-to-book
ratio. The market-to-book ratio reflects the extent to which the market value of
the firm is backed by assets in place. A higher market-to-book ratio suggests that
the firm has growth opportunities that have not materialised into nominal or real
assets in place yet. The inflation hedging qualities we explore relate to the extent to
which nominal assets in place are financed with nominal debt. A higher market-to-
book ratio, suggesting fewer assets in place relative to the market value of the firm,
appears to leave equity more exposed to unexpected inflation and, as a result, to
attenuate the inflation hedging qualities of investments into the firm’s equity.
Column 2 of Table 6 presents the effect of a change in the deviation from the opti-
mal match between nominal assets and liabilities on the change in the firms unex-
pected inflation beta. The sign on the coefficient is negative, resonating the result
for changes in real risk-adjusted performance, but here the coefficient is not statisti-
cally significant. Our evidence suggests that the marginal effect on inflation hedging
qualities of an additional small shift away from the optimal match between nomi-
nal assets and liabilities is constant. Our result implies that the incentives for firm
managers to correct deviations from the optimal match in order to improve the un-
expected inflation hedging qualities of investments into their firm’s equity do not
appear to vary by the magnitude of the current deviation.
Our findings imply that inflation hedging qualities of REITs may vary across firms
as a function of their capital structure. Several studies find evidence against the
suitability of listed REITs as an inflation hedge, consistent with results commonly
established for industrial stocks. 9 Darrat and Glascock (1989) consider the role of
9 See, for instance, Brueggeman, Chen, and Thibodeau (1984); Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders (1990);
Chatrath and Liang (1998); Ewing and Payne (2005); Goebel and Kim (1989); Gyourko and Linneman
(1988); Park, Mullineaux, and Chew (1990); Titman and Warga (1986); Yobaccio, Rubens, and Ketcham
(1995).
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monetary policy, real economic and financial indicators. Subsequently, Glascock, Lu,
and So (2002) argue that monetary policy drives the spurious negative relationship
between REIT returns and inflation. Simpson, Ramchander, and Webb (2007) dis-
tinguish between positive and negative changes in expected and unexpected inflation
and present evidence consistent with the suitability of equity REITs as an inflation
hedge. Hardin, Jiang, and Wu (2012) argue that inflation illusion may drive the
observation that in the short-term, REIT returns often appear to be negatively re-
lated to expected inflation. However, many studies to date focus on the index level
and thus implicitly assume that inflation hedging properties are equal across firms or
exogenously determined. Our findings provide a fundamental economic rationale be-
hind potential variation in inflation hedging properties across REITs that is related
to the capital structure choices of these firms.
Further, Case and Wachter (2011) postulate that if firms are net debtors, they will
benefit from unexpected changes in the price level through the redistribution effects
of inflation. They argue that REITs holding relatively large amounts of fixed-rate
debt should on average have relatively stronger returns, all else equal, during periods
of high inflation. However, these authors stop short of exploring the empirical evi-
dence for their argument. We present empirical evidence in favour of their argument.
More generally, our findings explore the relationship between the balance of a firm’s
nominal assets and liabilities and the sensitivity of its equity returns to unexpected
inflation. First, firms may not on average be net (nominal) debtors but, as our
evidence suggests, match nominal liabilities to nominal assets. The resulting cross-
sectional variation in nominal liabilities that is difficult to incorporate into analyses
on the index level may be partly responsible for the lack of strong evidence for REITs
as an inflation hedge. Further, firms may not universally benefit from simply holding
more nominal debt. Instead, the exact choice of the amount and term of nominal debt
that has to be matched with the amount and maturity of nominal assets appears to
matter. This explains why on average, a relationship between total nominal liabilities
and the inflation sensitivity of REIT returns may seem weak.
Furthermore, our results imply that REITs hold nominal debt to match nominal
assets. Our findings thus contribute to the debate about the potential drivers of REIT
leverage choices. This debate is driven by the difficulty to reconcile the theoretical
lack of incentive for REITs to use debt with the empirical observation that these
firms tend to hold significant levels of leverage, and often more than unregulated
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firms in a comparable line of business (Alcock, Steiner, and Tan, 2014; Harrison,
Panasian, and Seiler, 2011). 10 Against this background, several authors suggest
potential alternative explanations for the determinants of REIT leverage choices.
Brown and Riddiough (2003) report that REITs appear to target leverage in order
to maintain an investment-grade debt rating. Ooi, Ong, and Li (2010) and Boudry,
Kallberg, and Liu (2010) suggest that REIT debt issuance decisions are consistent
with the market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Further, Feng, Ghosh,
and Sirmans (2007) suggest that REITs trade off the lack of incentive for debt and
the adverse selection cost of equity. Alcock, Steiner, and Tan (2014) find that REITs
use debt to signal firm quality and optimise transaction costs. Alcock, Glascock, and
Steiner (2013) suggest that REITs employ leverage to manage market exposure and
modify risk-adjusted performance. In spite of these numerous suggestions for the
drivers of REIT capital structure decisions, Harrison, Panasian, and Seiler (2011)
conclude that a closer investigation and better understanding of the leverage choices
of these firms is needed. Our results suggest that REITs hold debt to match nominal
assets in an effort to improve real risk-adjusted performance by managing unexpected
inflationary shocks.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we model the real risk-adjusted return on firm equity as a function
of nominal as well as real assets and liabilities. We show that, everything else being
equal, firms can choose a capital structure to improve real risk-adjusted performance
by matching nominal assets with nominal liabilities in a monotonically increasing,
linear fashion. We illustrate that in doing so, firms reduce the sensitivity of real risk-
adjusted returns to unexpected inflation, improving the risk efficiency of investments
into their equity. Overall, our study establishes a simple interrelationship between
capital structure, real risk-adjusted performance and the inflation hedging qualities
of equities investments.
In order to test the resulting hypotheses, we focus on a sample of US listed eq-
10 The interest in REIT capital structure decisions is particularly fuelled by the limited explanatory power
of traditional leverage theories given the tax exemption of REITs, their strict pay-out requirements and
straight-forward business model. Howe and Shilling (1988) assert that in the absence of tax benefits, REITs
cannot compete for debt and will favour equity. Shilling (1994) argues that REIT value is maximised for
equity-only financing. Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu (2010) argue that, given their simple business model of
owning and operating real estate, REITs are a fairly transparent investment vehicle, limiting asymmetric
information problems and thus the relevance of the traditional pecking order theory. Pecking order also
assumes discretion over earnings, debt and equity. However, REIT pay-out requirements (Lehman and Roth,
2010) largely restrict funding choices to debt and equity.
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uity REITs, facilitating the identification of the relevant variables, thus reducing
measurement errors and improving the statistical power of our empirical tests. Con-
sistent with our hypotheses, we find that US listed equity REITs that adhere to the
suggested match between nominal assets and liabilities outperform their peers in
terms of the real Sharpe ratio. We further find that increasing deviations from the
optimal match between nominal assets and liabilities reduce the unexpected inflation
hedging qualities of investments into the firms’ equity.
Our findings have a number of practical implications. Financial managers are able
to employ our findings in the development of strategies to enhance real risk-adjusted
performance, conditional on a given asset structure. For investors, our finding sug-
gests that they are able to utilise information on the firm’s liability structure to draw
inferences about the firm’s potential to deliver strong real risk-adjusted performance.
Our results therefore have the potential to assist investors in improving the basis of
their decision-making process and help promote more efficient investment decisions.
In a wider context, our study contributes to the debate about the drivers of cor-
porate leverage choices. We provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that
firms choose debt holdings so as to improve real risk-adjusted performance via the
modification of equity exposure to unexpected inflationary shocks. Our results also
contribute to the debate about inflation hedging characteristics of equities invest-
ments. We provide evidence that equities investments offer stronger inflation hedging
qualities if the firms follow the optimal matching relationship between nominal assets
and liabilities. Our results allow us to explore an additional dimension of this de-
bate relating to the potential firm-level variation in inflation hedging characteristics.
From this perspective, our findings illustrate how inflation hedging characteristics
relate to capital structure choices via the management of the match between nominal
assets and liabilities.
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Fig. 1. The figure shows the time series evolution of different aspected of US CPI inflation over the study
period. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using
an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000), and expected inflation as the
predicted values from this exercise. We measure unexpected (expected) inflation uncertainty as the annual
standard deviation of monthly unexpected (expected) inflation figures over 12 months to year-end.
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Simulation for the real excess return to firm equity and its standard deviation
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(a) Expectation of real excess return
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(b) Standard deviation of real excess return
Fig. 2. The figure shows the results from the simulation of the real excess return to firm equity, in Figure
2(a), and its standard deviation, in Figure 2(b). The vectors for nominal assets and liabilities, AN0 , L
N
0 , are
101 × 1 each. The vectors for the normal random variables are 1, 000 × 1 each. Nominal assets are defined
as AN0 ∈ [0, 1]. We impose that AN0 ≥ 0 for going concern. The values for nominal liabilities LN0 are not
restricted. Nominal liabilities are LN0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Initial equity is E0 = 1. Real assets are AR0 = 0.1. Real
liabilities are the residual modelled as a linear function of the remaining asset, liability and equity positions,
LR0 = E0 +A
N
0 − LN0 +AR0 . This structure allows us to focus on nominal liabilities, conditional on a given
asset structure and initial equity. The random variables are drawn from a normal distribution. The real
return on LR0 in excess of the risk free rate is r ∼ N(0.05, 0.1). The return differential between real and
nominal items is α ∼ N(0.05, 0.05). The return differential between assets and liabilities is κ ∼ N(0.05, 0.04).
Unexpected inflation is u ∼ N(0, 0.05).
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Simulation for the real Sharpe ratio
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Fig. 3. The figure shows the results from the simulation of the real Sharpe ratio. The vectors for nominal
assets and liabilities, AN0 , L
N
0 , are 101× 1 each. The vectors for the normal random variables are 1, 000× 1
each. Nominal assets are defined as AN0 ∈ [0, 1]. We impose that AN0 ≥ 0 for going concern. The values for
nominal liabilities LN0 are not restricted. Nominal liabilities are L
N
0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Initial equity is E0 = 1. Real
assets are AR0 = 0.1. Real liabilities are the residual modelled as a linear function of the remaining asset,
liability and equity positions, LR0 = E0 + A
N
0 − LN0 + AR0 . This structure allows us to focus on nominal
liabilities, conditional on a given asset structure and initial equity. The random variables are drawn from a
normal distribution. The real return on LR0 in excess of the risk free rate is r ∼ N(0.05, 0.1). The return
differential between real and nominal items is α ∼ N(0.05, 0.05). The return differential between assets and
liabilities is κ ∼ N(0.05, 0.04). Unexpected inflation is u ∼ N(0, 0.05).
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Fig. 4. The figure shows the comparative statics of the model. The vectors for nominal assets and liabilities,
AN0 , L
N
0 , are 101 × 1 each. Nominal assets are defined as AN0 ∈ [0, 1]. We impose that AN0 ≥ 0 for going
concern. The values for nominal liabilities LN0 are not restricted and are L
N
0 ∈ [−1, 1]. Initial equity is
E0 = 1. Real assets are AR0 = 0.1. Real liabilities are the residual modelled as a linear function of the
remaining asset, liability and equity positions, LR0 = E0 +A
N
0 −LN0 +AR0 . This structure allows us to focus
on nominal liabilities, conditional on a given asset structure and initial equity. The random variables are
vectors of 1, 000×1 and drawn from a normal distribution. The real return on LR0 in excess of the risk free rate
is r ∼ N(0.05, 0.1). The return differential between real and nominal items is α ∼ N(0.05, 0.05). The return
differential between assets and liabilities is κ ∼ N(0.05, 0.04). Unexpected inflation is u ∼ N(0, 0.05). The
scenarios modify elements of the basic structure one by one as follows: Scenario 1 varies AR0 = [0.1, 0.5, 0.9].
Scenario 2 varies E0 = [1, 5, 10]. Scenario 3 varies u ∼ N(0, σ2u), σ2u = [0.03, 0.05, 0.07]. Scenario 4 varies
r ∼ N(µr, 0.1), µr = [0.03, 0.05, 0.07]. Scenario 5 varies α ∼ N(µα, 0.05), µα = [0.03, 0.05, 0.07]. Scenario 6
varies κ ∼ N(µκ, 0.05), µκ = [0.03, 0.05, 0.07].
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Line fit plot of log of nominal assets on unexpected rate of inflation (annual average of
monthly figures, based on CPI)
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Fig. 5. The figure shows a line fit plot from a regression of my chosen proxy for nominal assets, the natural
logarithm of the firm’s NAV as reported by SNL (discounted at an average rate of 7.5%) on unexpected
inflation. I measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an
ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000).
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Line fit plot of first differences in log of nominal assets on first differences in unexpected rate
of inflation (annual average of monthly figures, based on CPI)
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Fig. 6. The figure shows a line fit plot from a regression in first differences of my chosen proxy for nominal
assets, the natural logarithm of the firm’s NAV as reported by SNL (discounted at an average rate of 7.5%)
on unexpected inflation. I measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering monthly logged CPI
figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000).
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Histogram and descriptive statistics of unexpected inflation sensitivities of listed US equity
REITs over the full study period 1989-2011
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Unexpected inflation sensitivities
Percentiles Smallest Statistics
1% -33.513 -55.653 Mean 2.008
5% -19.396 -50.552 Standard deviation 15.313
10% -13.201 -41.234 Standard error 0.595
25% -4.754 -39.822 95% conf. interval
Lower 0.840
50% 0.642 Upper 3.177
Largest t-stat 3.375
75% 7.873 72.019 N 662
90% 15.997 74.747 Variance 234.477
95% 22.975 86.595 Skewness 1.903
99% 56.177 137.200 Kurtosis 16.220
Fig. 7. The figure shoes a histogram alongside a set of descriptive statistics for the unexpected inflation
sensitivities of the listed US equity REITs in our sample over the full study period. These estimates are
obtained using annual regressions of the nominal monthly firm excess returns (NRET ) on monthly unex-
pected inflation (UINFL) and a set of controls to obtain the annual coefficients measuring the sensitivity of
nominal firm returns to unexpected inflation. We measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering
monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000),
and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. In this regression, we control for the excess
return on the market (MKT ), size (SML) and value (HML) factors, expected inflation (EXPIN) and vari-
ation in the interest rate proxied by changes in the federal funds rate (CFFR). We collect the coefficients
on the unexpected inflation variable to compile a firm-year panel of unexpected inflation sensitivities.
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Regression results of NAV on unexpected inflation for listed US equity REITs over the full
study period 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LNNA LNNA D.LNNA D.LNNA
Unexpected inflation 28.547
(23.73)
L.Unexpected inflation 11.058
(31.26)
D.Unexpected inflation 18.228
(10.78)
L.D.Unexpected inflation -18.533
(18.89)
Constant 12.269*** 12.805*** 0.544* 0.377**
(0.23) (0.05) (0.25) (0.12)
Observations 622 501 501 409
R-squared 0.321 0.249 0.122 0.095
Number of firm clusters 87 81 81 76
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1
The table shows the results from a set of fixed-effects panel regressions of my chosen proxy for nominal
assets, the natural logarithm of the firm’s NAV as reported by SNL (discounted at an average rate of 7.5%)
on unexpected inflation (Column (1)) and the lag of unexpected inflation (Column (2)). Columns (3) and (4)
replicate these regressions in first differences. I measure unexpected inflation as the residual from filtering
monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984; Vassalou, 2000).
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows; ***
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Control variables and proxies
Variable Measurement References
MAT: Debt maturity Ratio of long-term debt matur-
ing in more than 3 years to total
debt
Leland and Toft (1996)
LNSIZE: Firm size Log of market value of the firm’s
assets
Myers and Majluf (1984)
PROFIT: Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to book value
of assets
Donaldson (1961); Myers and
Majluf (1984)
MB: Market-to-book ratio Book value of assets minus book
value of common equity plus
market value of common equity
relative to book value of assets
Myers (1977)
ABEARN: Abnormal earnings Change in earnings per share rel-
ative to share price
Ross (1977)
VOL: Earnings volatility Standard deviation of 1st diff. in
EBITDA over 4 years, scaled by
average assets over these years
Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984)
DNOL: Alternative tax shields Dummy for operating loss car-
ried forward, 1 in presence of al-
ternative tax shield
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)
IV for debt maturity Measurement Reference
AMAT: Asset maturity Log of gross depreciable assets to
depreciation expense
Myers (1977)
DRATED: Debt rating Dummy, 1 in presence of debt
rating
Diamond (1991); Sharpe (1991);
Titman (1992)
TERM: Term structure Yield on 10-yr. relative to 6-
month government bond
Brick and Ravid (1985)
IV for nominal assets Measurement Reference
LNRPP: Log of rental revenue
per property
Ratio of rental revenue to aver-
age properties
Suggested here
Table 2
The table shows the main capital structure control variables employed in our regression, alongside their
proxies and measurement as well as the reference to the original theory. Where possible, our proxy choices
follow the suggestions by the original authors. All firm-level and balance sheet data is obtained from SNL
and Compustat. Bond yields have been obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s Economic
Database.
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Descriptive statistics for the sample firms over the full study period 1989-2011
VARIABLES Mean Median Min Max S.D. N
Nominal debt to equity ratio 1.908 1.369 -161.407 67.389 8.762 533
Nominal assets to equity ratio 2.410 2.147 -97.228 56.342 6.312 533
Firm size 1277.819 668.664 0.440 16801.184 1954.373 533
Debt maturity 0.486 0.496 0.000 1.000 0.201 533
Asset maturity 33.097 31.430 14.306 124.528 10.142 533
Profitability 0.080 0.084 -0.160 0.212 0.034 533
Market-to-book ratio 1.236 1.190 0.576 2.457 0.287 533
Abnormal earnings -0.021 -0.002 -3.065 2.818 0.283 533
Volatility 0.024 0.014 0.001 0.201 0.029 533
Proportion of firm years with
Loss carried forward 0.090 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.287 533
Debt rated dummy 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 533
Term structure 1.852 2.160 -0.350 3.610 1.345 533
Table 3
The table reports descriptive statistics the REITs in our final sample between 1989 and 2011 from Compustat
and SNL database. Variables are defined as: Nominal debt to equity is the ratio of fixed-rate debt to book
value of equity. Nominal assets to equity is the ratio of the firm’s NAV to book value of equity. Log of Firm
Size is measured by the natural logarithm of the market value of the firm’s assets (in millions of August
1982 US$, deflated by PPI). Debt Maturity is measured by the proportion of long-term debt relative to
total debt. Log of Asset Maturity is measured by the natural logarithm of the ratio of depreciable assets to
depreciation. Profitability is measured as the ratio of EBITDA to book value of assets. Market-to-book ratio
is measured by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Abnormal Earnings is the
difference between earnings per share in year t+1 minus earnings per share in year t, divided by the year t
share price. Earnings volatility is measured by the standard deviation of first differences in EBITDA over
the four years preceding the sample year, scaled by average assets for that period. Term Structure is the
difference between the month-end yields on a 10-year government bond and a 6-month government bond,
matched to the month of a firm’s fiscal year end. Bond yields are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis’s economic database. Each of the dummy variables (operating loss carried forward and debt rating)
equals 1 if the firm has its respective items, 0 otherwise.
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Regression results for Hypothesis 1, 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES SRR SRR SRR D.SRR
Deviation (proportion = 0.255) -0.022***
(0.00)
Deviation (proportion = 0.565) -0.034***
(0.01)
Deviation (proportion = 1) -0.015***
(0.00)
D.Deviation (proportion = 1) -0.063***
(0.01)
Debt maturity 0.159 0.141 0.127 0.829
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.74)
Log of firm size -0.042 -0.044 -0.045 0.243
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.28)
Profitability 0.019 -0.001 0.126 -5.703
(0.82) (0.83) (0.82) (6.39)
Market to book 0.245 0.222 0.236 -1.279
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (1.18)
Abnormal earnings -0.011 -0.012 -0.010 -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11)
Volatility of earnings 1.189 1.147 1.045 1.616
(0.85) (0.84) (0.83) (2.77)
Loss carried forward 0.024 0.033 0.033 -0.273
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.37)
Constant 0.394 0.456 0.427 -3.461
(1.22) (1.24) (1.25) (3.87)
Observations 451 451 451 439
R-squared 0.307 0.301 0.298 0.077
Firm clusters 78 78 78 76
Property type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 5
The table presents the results from a set of fixed effects panel regression models for our final sample of
REITs over the full period 1989-2011. We estimate the firm’s annual real Sharpe ratio (Columns 1 to 3)
and the change in the annual real Sharpe ratio (column 2) as a function of the deviation (DEV ) from its
optimal nominal liability holdings (column 1) and the change in this deviation (Column 4). We obtain the
annual real Sharpe ratio of a firm by computing its average annual real excess return over the risk-free rate
and dividing by the volatility of this return. We measure DEV by computing the annual squared differences
between nominal assets and liabilities (both deflated by the Producer Price Index constant in August 1982,
in millions of US$). In Column (1), DEV is calculated using the constant of proportionality obtained from
Table 4, Column (1). In Column (2), DEV is calculated using the constant of proportionality obtained from
Table 4, Column (4). In Columns (3) and (4), DEV is calculated using a constant of proportionality of
unity. We control for the commonly employed capital structure determinants as well as property type and
year effects, using dummy variables. Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses, significance
is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Regression results for Hypothesis 2, 1989-2011
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Inflation sensitivity D.Inflation sensitivity
Deviation (proportion = 1) -0.468*
(0.26)
D.Deviation (proportion = 1) -0.484
(0.33)
Debt maturity -21.963*** -11.655
(6.11) (8.18)
Log of firm size 0.610 -3.681
(1.88) (3.19)
Profitability 24.811 129.220
(26.33) (85.43)
Market to book -13.935*** -1.090
(3.75) (8.60)
Abnormal earnings 1.826 3.956
(2.67) (3.53)
Volatility of earnings 55.758 -58.427
(38.50) (56.12)
Loss carried forward 3.240 1.477
(3.69) (6.67)
Constant 15.521 49.710
(35.13) (57.22)
Observations 440 427
R-squared 0.075 0.270
Firm clusters 75 73
Property type dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Table 6
The table presents the results from a set of fixed effects panel regression models for our final sample of REITs
over the full period 1989-2011. We estimate the firms’ sensitivity to unexpected inflation as a function
of the deviation (assuming a constant of proportionality of unity) from their optimal nominal liabilities
(column 1) and present the results from an identical regression considering annual changes in the unexpected
inflation beta as a function of changes in this deviation (column 2), controlling for the usual set of capital
structure determinants, including maturity, as well as property type and year dummies. We measure the
firm’s sensitivity to unexpected inflation using annual regressions of the nominal monthly firm excess returns
(NRET ) on monthly unexpected inflation (UINFLS). We measure unexpected inflation as the residual
from filtering monthly logged CPI figures using an ARIMA(0,1,1) specification (Fama and Gibbons, 1984;
Vassalou, 2000), and expected inflation as the predicted values from this exercise. 11 In this regression,
we control for the excess return on the market (MKT ), size (SML) and value (HML) factors, expected
inflation (EXPIN) and variation in the interest rate proxied by changes in the federal funds rate (CFFR).
We collect the coefficients on UINFL, resulting in a firm-year panel of unexpected inflation sensitivities
UINFLS. We remedy the bias in the standard errors from heteroskedasticity potentially introduced by
the estimated dependent variable using robust standard errors clustered by firm (Lewis and Linzer, 2005).
Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) in parentheses, significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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